For economists, sustainability and environmental valuation are connected in two ways. At the micro level, proper environmental valuation is required if projects are to be approved and rejected consistently with sustainability requirements. This is cost benefit analysis. At the macro level, many take the view that sustainability requires that national income measurement be modified so as to account for environmental damage. Such natural resource accounting is possible only if environmental damage is valued for incorporation into the economic accounts. The paper (...) reviews the techniques that economists have developed for environmental valuation. In regard to cost benefit analysis and sustainability, it is noted that the technique on which most interest focuses, the Contingent Valuation Method, involves the extension of the domain of consumer demand analysis to include the natural environment. Contributions questioning the appropriateness of this are reviewed, and it is argued that they merit more attention from economists than they have received to date. In regard to natural resource accounting, it is argued that while there is little prospect of it achieving what its proponents claim for it, the modelling that it necessarily implies has the potential to both clarify valuation issues and play an important role in informing the policy process. (shrink)

In Democracy and the Claims of Nature, the leading thinkers in the fields of environmental, political, and social theory come together to discuss the tensions and sympathies of democratic ideals and environmental values. The prominent contributors reflect upon where we stand in our understanding of the relationship between democracy and the claims of nature. Democracy and the Claims of Nature bridges the gap between the often competing ideals of the two fields, leading to a greater understanding of each for the (...) other. (shrink)

iinstein oered the prin™iple of gener—l ™ov—ri—n™e —s the fund—ment—l physi™—l prin™iple of his gener—l theory of rel—tivityD —nd —s responsi˜le for extending the prin™iple of rel—tivity to —™™eler—ted motionF „his view w—s disputed —lmost immedi—tely with the ™ounterE™l—im th—t the prin™iple w—s no rel—tivity prin™iple —nd w—s physi™—lly v—™uousF „he dis—greeE ment persists tod—yF „his —rti™le reviews the development of iinstein9s thought on gener—l ™ov—ri—n™eD its rel—tion to the found—tions of gener—l rel—tivity —nd the evolution of the ™ontinuing de˜—te (...) over his viewpointF.. (shrink)

sn y™to˜er —nd xovem˜er IWHUD just over two ye—rs —fter the ™ompletion of his spe™i—l theory of rel—tivityD iinstein m—de the ˜re—kthrough th—t set him on the p—th to the gener—l theory of rel—tivityF ‡hile prep—ring — review —rti™le on his new spe™i—l theory of rel—tivityD he ˜e™—me ™onvin™ed th—t the key to the extension of the prin™iple of rel—tivity to —™™eler—ted motion l—y in the rem—rk—˜le —nd unexpl—ined empiri™—l ™oin™iden™e of the equ—lity of inerti—l —nd gr—vit—tion—l m—ssesF „o interpret (...) —nd exploit this ™oin™iden™eD he introdu™ed — new —nd powerful physi™—l prin™ipleD soon to ˜e ™—lled the ’prin™iple of equiv—len™e4 upon whi™h his se—r™h for — gener—l theory of reE l—tivity would ˜e ˜—sedF woreoverD with the ™ompletion of the theory —nd throughout the rem—inder of his lifeD iinstein insisted on the fund—ment—l import—n™e of the prin™iple to his gener—l theory of rel—tivityF iinstein9s insisten™e on this point h—s ™re—ted — puzzle for philosophers —nd histori—ns of s™ien™eF st h—s ˜een —rgued vigorously th—t the prin™iple in its tr—dition—l formul—tion does not hold in th™ gener—l theory of rel—tivityD gonsiderD for ex—mpleD — tr—dition—l formul—tion su™h —s €—uli9s in his IWPI Encyklopadie —rti™leF por €—uli the prin™iple —sserts th—t one ™—n —lw—ys tr—nsform —w—y —n —r˜itr—ry gr—vit—tion—l eld in —n innitely sm—ll region of sp—™eEtimeD ˜y tr—nsforming to —n —ppropri—te ™oordin—te system @€—uli IWPID pF IRSAF sn responseD su™h eminent rel—tivists —s ƒynge @IWTHD pF ixAD —nd even iddington ˜efore him @IWPRD ppF QW{RIAD h—ve o˜je™ted th—t — ™oordin—te tr—nsform—tion or ™h—nge of st—te of motion of the o˜server ™—n h—ve no ee™t on the presen™e or —˜sen™e of — gr—vit—tion—l eldF „he presen™e of — ’true4 gr—vit—tion—l eld is determined ˜y —n inv—ri—nt ™riterionD the ™urv—ture of the metri™F „he gr—vit—tionEfree ™—se of spe™i—l rel—tivity is just the ™—se in whi™h this ™urv—ture v—nishesD where—s the true gr—vit—tion—l elds of gener—l rel—tivity —re distinguished ˜y the nonv—nishing of this ™urv—tureF „his o˜je™tion h—s immedi—te r—mi™—tions for the ’iinstein elev—tor4 thought experimentD whi™h is ™ommonly used in the formul—tion of the prinE ™iple of equiv—len™eF sn this thought experimentD — sm—ll ™h—m˜ers su™h —s.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz and Bayle: Manicheism and Dialectic DAVID NORTON LEIBNIZ' CLAIM that this is the "best of all possible worlds" has seemed so prima facie absurd that his critics have often considered the assertion adequately refuted by their pointing to things which are clearly "bad" and which might conceivably be "better." The paradigm case is Voltaire's Candide, which is certainly an effective refutation of Leibniz' claim at this level. (...) We can, however, by taking another point of view find what appear to be other absurdities in Leibniz' metaphysics. The point of view I wish to take, or attempt to take, is that of Pierre Bayle. I wish to suggest some objections to Leibniz which Bayle may have felt, but which he did not make explicit. Such an undertaking will, hopefully, add to our understanding of both Leibniz and Bayle. I What I propose to do is unorthodox, or at least unusual, and for that reason it is extremely important that the reader have from the very outset a clear idea of what is being undertaken. I can best clarify my aims, I think, by first attending briefly to some historical matters. Between 1695 and 1699 Bayle and Leibniz carried on a lively controversy over the latter's metaphysical views, though the debate was limited almost entirely to the notion of pre-established harmony. This controversy is well enough known that we need not stop over its details; in summary, Bayle first admits delight at what appears to be a new metaphysical explanation of the union of mind and body, but then goes on to argue that, after all, Leibniz' system is either no more than a reformulation of occasionalism, or impossible, since it violates clear and accepted metaphysical canons? Now, so far as we know, Bayle did not comment further on Leibniz' metaphysics, though the latter was * I wish to thank Prof. Harry M. Bracken, Arizona State University, and Prof. Richard H. Popkin, University of California, San Diego, for the suggestions and criticisms which they made of an earlier form of this paper. Their suggestions were all enlightening, if not all adopted-meaning, of course, that they would probably not agree with all that I here suggest. x Pierre Bayle, Dictionaire historique et critique, 5=. 6dition, revue, corrig6e, et augment6e, avec la vie de l'auteur, par Mr. Des Maizeaux, 4 tomes (Amsterdam, Leide. La Haye, Utrecht: 1740), article "Rorarius," reins. H. and L. For a fuller account of the Bayle-Leibniz controversy, see Austin Farrer, "Editor's Introduction," in G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, ed. Austin Farrer, trans. E. M. Huggard (London: 1951), pp. 7-47, esp. pp. 33-47. 24 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY eager to continue the controversy, and did so, his final effort being a gigantic one, the Essais de Thdodicde. Unfortunately, Bayle died before the Thdodicde was published and was deprived accordingly of any opportunity to reply to it. Bayle did, however, leave in the Dictionaire historique et critique a number of arguments against various metaphysical positions. The point of my paper is to show that certain of these arguments are applicable to Leibniz' system, and that applied to that system they reveal features of it which we might otherwise have overlooked. Bayle adduces arguments which seem with only slight modification to point directly at Leibniz--though without indicating that he has Leibniz in mind. I hope first of all to show what these arguments are and in what sense they refute Leibniz. I have said that Bayle gives no indication that these arguments of his apply to Leibniz; strictly speaking, this is correct. This does not mean, however, that I am understaking an unjustified wild goose chase through the Dictionaire : Bayle himself offers the motivation which has led to this study when he says in "Rorarius" (rem. L) that he has withheld some objections to Leibniz' opinions on the ground that these are no more objections to Leibniz than to certain other philosophers: "Je m'abstiens aussi de toutes les Objections qui ne sont pas plus contraires ~t son sentiment qu'~t celui de quelques autres Philosophes." In one sense then this paper can be thought of as my speculations of what these waived objections are... (shrink)

The world appears to conscious creatures in terms of experienced sensory qualities, but science doesn't find sensory experience in that world, only physical objects and properties. I argue that the failure to locate consciousness in the world is a function of our necessarily representational relation to reality as knowers: we won't discover the terms in which reality is represented by us in the world as it appears in those terms. Qualia -- arguably a type of representational content -- will therefore (...) not be found in the physical world as characterized in experience or science. Instead, consciousness constitutes a subjective, representational reality for cognitive systems such as ourselves, and the physical world is a represented objective reality. I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behaviour-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically instantiated mind-systems. I evaluate a variety of current hypotheses about consciousness, and suggest that a mature science of representation may help explain why, perhaps as matter of representational necessity, experience arises as a natural but not objectively discoverable phenomenon. (shrink)

This essay offers a theoretical analysis of the changes which are taking place in the musical consciousness of listeners in the present phase of society. The author seeks rather to deduce the conditions of musical reception from the present stage of musical production. The first part of the article deals with changes in production as they affect the general consciousness of listeners. Light music is discussed as well as serious music insofar as it reaches the consumer. Changes in reception are (...) revealed in certain characteristics like the cult of the melody, of the voice, of the master violin, and they are tied up with specific economic concepts. Success plays a particularly important role in this connection.The second part is devoted to the retrogression in listening, analyzed psychologically. Docile passivity, imitation of pre-given patterns, and bitter resentment of the „abnormal“ have become characteristic for the listener. The author shows how this retrogression has become concretized in the formation of a „musical child’s language.“Many listeners seek to overcome passivity by a pseudo-activity. The social function of certain types like the jitter-bug, the radio amateur, or the man with a knack for jazz, are discussed.L’article entreprend d’interpréter sous forme d’une esquisse théorique les transformations qu’a subies la conscience musicale des auditeurs dans la phase actuelle de l’évolution sociale.On n’analyse pas psychologiquement les réactions des auditeurs ; mais on prend pour point de départ Tétât de la production, et de celui-ci on déduit celui de la réception.La première partie traite de la transformation de la production dans la mesure où celle-ci atteint la conscience commune des auditeurs. L’auteur considère aussi bien la musique légère que la soi-disant musique sérieuse et les modifications que connaît celle-ci pour parvenir à la consommation.Ces modifications font de la musique un fétiche. On en prend pour exemple le culte des „idées“ musicales, de la voix et des „violons de maître“. Le caractère fétiche de la musique se mesure au succès accumulé.Ensuite, on développe quelques catégories du fétichisme musical : dépravation, arrangement, „divertissement élevé“, idolâtrie de la perfection.Au fétichisme de la musique correspond du côté de l’auditeur une régression de la faculté d’entendre — phénomène qui fait l’objet de la deuxième partie de l’étude. On l’interprète comme l’attitude auditive caractéristique des „régressifs“. Soumission passive, imitation de l’antérieurement donné, fureur contre ce qui sort de la norme — définissent cette attitude, qui s’objective en un langage musical puéril en formation et dont quelques éléments sont esquissés.A cette passivité, de larges groupes d’auditeurs cherchent vainement à échapper par une pseudo-activité. Quelques types de pseudo-activité sont décrits : l’enthousiaste, le bricoleur et le „chic type“. On montre la fonction sociale de ces types.Enfin, on traite des possibilités dialectiques de l’audition du régressif. Une confrontation de l’expérience fondamentale de la musique radicalement neuve avec le mode régressif d’entendre termine l’article. (shrink)

The Database on Ethics Related Legislation and Guidelines was launched in March 2007 as the fourth database of the UNESCO Global Ethics Observatory system of databases in ethics of science and technology. The database offers a collection of legal instruments searchable by region, country, bioethical themes, legal categories and applicability to specific articles of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights and International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. This paper discusses the background and rationale for the database and (...) its role as a consultative and comparative resource hub for the study of ethics related legal instruments across the world, with the purpose of informing and inspiring relevant stakeholders on the implementation of the principles contained within the UNESCO declarations on bioethics. (shrink)

I. Homeric Hymn to Apollo 334: κκλντε νν μοι γαα κα ορανòσ ερσ περθεν, TιτǴνεσ τε θεοιí π χθον ναιετοντεσ τρταρον μφ μγαν, τν ξ νδρεσ τε θεο τε.

As the apparent variant is in the text, Ludvvich alters the scholion into S0009838800018516_inline1, which has not been found in any MS. so far. The only noticeable point prima facie about S0009838800018516_inline2 is that it is an S0009838800018516_inline3 . Therefore I would read S0009838800018516_inline6. Ludwich's index to his A.H.T. gives cases of the omission of ov or OVK in the scholia. We need not restrict S0009838800018516_inline7 There is too much tendency to restrict usage in matters of language. At one time (...) it was believed that μxs22EFποτε was the property of Didymus! S0009838800018516_inline8 ‘passage’ does not occur in the scholia we possess, τόπος however does . Compare the note on H 96S0009838800018516_eqnU1xs22EFν xs1F04λλxs1FF3 xs1F51βριταxs22EF. We must supply in sense χωρxs22EFxs1FF3, for the reference is to Callim. Del. 69, where this is the meaning of xs22EFπειλητxs22EFρες. (shrink)

Enough and too much has been written about the Epic Cycle. Upon scanty quotations and a jejune epitome a tedious literature has been built. The older writers, such as Welcker, tried to ‘reconstruct’—as profitable and satisfying a task as inferring a burnt manor-house from its cellars; later scholars have gone out in tracing the tradition of the poems through the learned age of Greece—a scaffolding without ties, by which this or that conclusion is reached according to temperamental disposition to this (...) or that fallacy. I do not intend to enter more than is needful into a controversy where so far as I can see everyone has gone beyond the evidence. If I add to the bulk of the literature, it is in the hope of putting things in their proper places and of presenting the data as they appear to a future editor. (shrink)

Mr. Agar has collected his adversaria on the Odyssey which have been enjoying cold storage these many years in the blue depths of the Journal of Philology, and increased them by about three-quarters. He has produced a very interesting and valuable book, the most important contribution to the linguistic history of the Homeric text that has been made for a long time. Mr. Agar holds that the language of Homer represents the original ‘Achaean’ speech, and that its abnormalities in vocabulary, (...) word-formation and metre are the result of natural unforced processes of transmission. This position, held by so well equipped and so trenchant an investigator as Mr. Agar, is reassuring. It does not involve any of the mythological factors of the Higher or the Lower Criticism still recommended among us by Mr. Leaf, Father Browne and Mr. Verrall–Pisistratus, Onomacritus, the Ionian conquest of Smyrna, the Thessalian Iliad, the original Achilleis,–and disagrees with Professor Murray's sinister diagnosis clear away the Attic surface and there rises beneath another surface with another set of corruptions, where Ionic rhapsodes have introduced just the same elements of confusion into an Aeolic or at least a pre-Ionic language. The confusion of tongues is deep down in the heart of the Homeric, dialect, and no surgery in the world can cut beneath it’ . The last ten years’ work in Comparative Philology has made it clearer and clearer that the rule-of-thumb for distinguishing the historical non-Dorian dialects does not apply to the heroic and post-heroic age, and that the terms ‘Aeolic’ and ‘Ionic’ in their usual sense should disappear from the history of Homer. The Homeric tongue derives directly from the pre-colonial language of Greece wherein two elements are discernible, the original Ionian and the Achaean or North-Greek which overlaid it. (shrink)

Mr. Agar has collected his adversaria on the Odyssey which have been enjoying cold storage these many years in the blue depths of the Journal of Philology, and increased them by about three-quarters. He has produced a very interesting and valuable book, the most important contribution to the linguistic history of the Homeric text that has been made for a long time. Mr. Agar holds that the language of Homer represents the original ‘Achaean’ speech, and that its abnormalities in vocabulary, (...) word-formation and metre are the result of natural unforced processes of transmission. This position, held by so well equipped and so trenchant an investigator as Mr. Agar, is reassuring. It does not involve any of the mythological factors of the Higher or the Lower Criticism still recommended among us by Mr. Leaf, Father Browne and Mr. Verrall–Pisistratus, Onomacritus, the Ionian conquest of Smyrna, the Thessalian Iliad, the original Achilleis,–and disagrees with Professor Murray's sinister diagnosis clear away the Attic surface and there rises beneath another surface with another set of corruptions, where Ionic rhapsodes have introduced just the same elements of confusion into an Aeolic or at least a pre-Ionic language. The confusion of tongues is deep down in the heart of the Homeric, dialect, and no surgery in the world can cut beneath it’. The last ten years’ work in Comparative Philology has made it clearer and clearer that the rule-of-thumb for distinguishing the historical non-Dorian dialects does not apply to the heroic and post-heroic age, and that the terms ‘Aeolic’ and ‘Ionic’ in their usual sense should disappear from the history of Homer. The Homeric tongue derives directly from the pre-colonial language of Greece wherein two elements are discernible, the original Ionian and the Achaean or North-Greek which overlaid it. (shrink)

Circumstances have allowed me to inspect the Paris MSS. of Strabo and to collate them for a portion of Book IX. , in view of an edition of Strabo's Thessaly which Mr. A. J. B. Wace has in contemplation.

Circumstances have allowed me to inspect the Paris MSS. of Strabo and to collate them for a portion of Book IX., in view of an edition of Strabo's Thessaly which Mr. A. J. B. Wace has in contemplation.

οδ γρ εδεης νδρ νον οδ γυναι πρν πειρηθεης σπερ ποζγου, οδ κεν εκσσαις σπερ ποτ’ ς ριον λθν. πολλκι γνμην ξαπατσ’ δαι. ς ριον A , σριον the rest.